The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones by Kende, Michael




The Internet is not a monolithic, uniform net-
work; rather, it is a network of networks, owned
and operated by different companies, including
Internet backbone providers. Internet backbones
deliver data traffic to and from their customers;
often this traffic comes from, or travels to, cus-
tomers of another backbone. Currently, there are
no domestic or international industry-specific reg-
ulations that govern how Internet backbone prov-
iders interconnect to exchange traffic, unlike
other network services, such as long distance voice
services, for which interconnection is regulated.'
Rather, Internet backbone providers adopt and
pursue their own interconnection policies, gov-
erned only by ordinary laws of contract and prop-
erty, overseen by antitrust rules. This paper exam-
ines the interconnection policies between In-
ternet backbone providers that have evolved in
place of industry-specific regulations in order to
examine the impact of these policies on the mar-
kets for Internet services.
In order to provide end users with universal
connectivity, Internet backbones must intercon-
nect with one another to exchange traffic des-
tined for each others' end users. Interconnection
agreements between Internet backbone providers
are reached through commercial negotiations in
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a "handshake" environment. Internet backbones
interconnect under two different arrangements:
peering or transit. In a peering arrangement,
backbones agree to exchange traffic with each
other at no cost. The backbones only exchange
traffic that is destined for each other's end users,
not the end users of a third party. In a transit ar-
rangement, on the other hand, one backbone
pays another backbone for interconnection. In
exchange for this payment, the transit supplier
provides a connection to all end users on the In-
ternet.
The interconnection policies that have evolved
in place of industry-specific regulations are ex-
amined here in order to determine the impact of
these policies on the markets for Internet services.
In the past several years, a number of parties have
questioned whether larger backbone providers
are able to gain or exploit market power through
the terms of interconnection that they offer to
smaller existing and new backbone providers. In
the future, backbones may attempt to differenti-
ate themselves by offering certain new services
only to their own customers. As a result, the con-
cern is that the Internet may "balkanize," with
competing backbones not interconnecting to pro-
vide all services. This paper demonstrates how, in
the absence of a dominant backbone, market
author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Analysys Consulting Limited, the FCC, the Chairman, any
Commissioners or other FCC staff.
1 For purposes of this paper, "industry-specific regula-
tions" are defined to be rules, applied by an expert agency,
that govern the behavior of companies in a particular indus-
try. These regulations supplement the antitrust laws and ordi-
nary common law rules that apply to all industries in the
United States. In general, industry-specific regulations cor-
rect for market failures that antitrust laws and ordinary com-
mon law cannot resolve or prevent. In this paper, an "unreg-
ulated industry" is one that is not subject to any industry-spe-
cific regulations.
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forces encourage interconnection between back-
bones and thereby protect consumers from any
anti-competitive behavior on the part of backbone
providers. While it is likely that market forces, in
combination with antitrust and competition poli-
cies, can guarantee that no dominant backbone
emerges, if a dominant backbone provider should
emerge through unforeseen circumstances, regu-
lation may be necessary, as it has been in other
network industries such as telephony.
Section two of this paper examines the history
of Internet interconnection and describes current
interconnection policies between Internet back-
bones. Section three examines several current
and potential pressures on the domestic system of
interconnection, showing how backbones may at-
tempt to differentiate themselves from their com-
petitors in the future by not interconnecting at all
to exchange traffic flowing from innovative new
services. The conclusion, in Section four, shows
how competition, governed by antitrust laws and
competition enforcement that can prevent the
emergence of a dominant firm, can act to restrain
the actions of larger backbones in place of any in-




Interconnection arrangements enable each In-
ternet user to communicate with every other In-
ternet user.2 For simplicity, this paper focuses on
the interactions between four groups of Internet
participants: end users, content providers, In-
ternet service providers ("ISPs") and Internet
backbone providers ("backbones"). Using the In-
2 For further discussion of the structure of the Internet,
see FCC, OPP Working Paper, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE IN-
TERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (authored by Ke-
vin Werbach) 10-12 [hereinafter DIGITAL TORNADO]; see also
JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS 268-272 (2000);J. Scoi-r MARCUS, DESIGN-
INC WIDE AREA NETWORKS AND INTERNEIWORKS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 274-289 (1999) [hereinafter MARCUS].
3 See Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition, at http://
public.wsj.com/home.html.
4 See Amazon.com, at http://www.amazon.com.
5 See America Online, at http://www.aol.com.
6 See EarthLink, Inc., at http://www.eartllink.net.
7 A "leased line" is an access line rented for the exclusive
use of the customer; with dedicated access to an ISP, the cus-
tomer can be logged on to the Internet twenty-four hours a
ternet, end users communicate with each other,
access information from content providers, such
as the Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition,
3
and purchase products or services from e-com-
merce vendors, such as Amazon.com. 4 End users
access the Internet via ISPs such as America On-
line ("AOL") 5 or EarthLink, Inc. 6 Small business
and residential end users generally use modems
to connect to their ISP over standard telephone
lines, while larger businesses and content provid-
ers generally have dedicated access to their ISP
over leased lines. 7 ISPs are generally connected to
other ISPs through Internet backbone providers
such as UUNET and PSINet.8 Backbones own or
lease national or international high-speed fiber
optic networks that are connected by routers,
which the backbones use to deliver traffic to and
from their ISP customers. 9 Many backbones also
are vertically integrated, functioning as ISPs by
selling Internet access directly to end users, as
well as having ISPs as customers.' 0
Each backbone provider essentially forms its
own network that enables all its connected end
users and content providers to communicate with
one another.'' End users, however, are generally
not interested in communicating just with end
users and content providers connected to the
same backbone provider; rather, they want to be
able to communicate with a wide variety of end
users and content providers, regardless of the
backbone provider. 12 In order to provide end
users with such universal connectivity, backbones
must interconnect with one another to exchange
traffic destined for each others' end users. 13 Inter-
connection makes the Internet the "network of
networks" that it is today. As a result of wide-
spread interconnection, end users currently have
day. New broadband access technologies, such as xDSL and
cable modems, increasingly are replacing traditional dial-up
modems, enabling residential and small business customers
to receive the same high-speed, "always-on" access to the In-
ternet enJoyed by dedicated access customers.
8 See PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WoRKS 5-7
(Millennium ed. 1999).
9 Id.
10 INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, To PEER OR NOT TO
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an implicit expectation of universal connectivity
whenever they log on to the Internet, regardless
of which ISP they choose. ISPs are therefore in
the business of selling access to the entire In-
ternet to their end-user customers.' 4 ISPs
purchase this universal access from Internet back-
bones.15 The driving force behind the need for
backbones to deliver access to the whole Internet
to customers is what is known in economics litera-
ture as network externalities.
B. Network Externalities
Network externalities arise when the value, or
utility, that a consumer derives from a product or
service increases as a function of the number of
other consumers of the same or compatible prod-
ucts or services.16 They are called network exter-
nalities because they generally arise for networks
whose purpose it is to enable each user to com-
municate with other users; as a result, by defini-
tion, the more users there are, the more valuable
the network. 17 These benefits are externalities be-
cause a user, when deciding whether tojoin a net-
work (or which network to join), only takes into
account the private benefits that the network will
bring her and will not consider the fact that her
joining this network increases the benefit of the
network for other users.' 8
Network externalities can be direct or indirect.
Network externalities are direct for networks that
consumers use to communicate with one another;
the more consumers that use the network, the
more valuable the network is for each con-
sumer. 19 The phone system is a classic example of
a system providing direct network externalities.
The only benefit of such a system comes from ac-
cess to the network of users. Network externalities
14 Id.
15 See FCC, OPP, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF
THE INTERNET (authored by Jason Oxman) (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Oxman] (discussing generally the deregulation trend of
the Internet).
16 See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994);
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L].
INDUS. ORG. 673 (1996) [hereinafter Economides].
17 Metcalfe's law, which states that the value of a network
grows in proportion to the square of the number of users of
the network, is a specific expression of network externalities.
See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 447-48
(14th ed. 1998) [hereinafter NEWrON]; see also, Economides,
supra note 16.
18 Oxman, supra note 15, at 13.
are indirect for systems that require both hard-
ware and software in order to provide benefits.
20
As more consumers buy hardware, more hard-
ware-compatible software will be produced, mak-
ing this hardware more valuable to users. 21 A clas-
sic example is the compact disc system; as more
consumers purchased compact disc players, music
companies increased the variety of compact discs
available, making the players more valuable to
their owners.22 These network externalities are in-
direct because consumers do not purchase the sys-
tems to communicate directly with others, yet they
benefit indirectly from the adoption decision of
other consumers.
One unique characteristic of the Internet is
that it offers both direct and indirect network ex-
ternalities. Users of applications such as e-mail
and Internet telephony derive direct network ex-
ternalities from the system: the more Internet
users there are, the more valuable the Internet is
for such communications. Users of applications
such as the World Wide Web derive indirect net-
work externalities from the system: the more In-
ternet users there are, the more Web content will
be developed, which makes the Internet even
more valuable for its users. The ability to provide
direct and indirect network externalities to cus-
tomers provides an almost overpowering incentive
for Internet backbones to cooperate with one an-
other by interconnecting their networks.
C. Peering and Transit
During the early development of the Internet,
there was only one backbone, and, therefore, in-
terconnection between backbones was not an is-
sueY3 In 1986, the National Science Foundation
("NSF") funded the NSFNET, a 56-kilobit per sec-
19 See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. ECoN. REV.,
424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro].
20 See generally Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Network Ef-
fects, Software Provision, and Standardization, 40J. INDUS. ECON.
85 (1992).
21 See Oz SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND A-
PLICATIONS 254 (1996).
22 For an empirical description of the interplay between
compact disc hardware sales and the availability of compact
discs, see Neil Gandal, Michael Kende, & Rafael Rob, The Dy-
namics of Technological Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems:
The Case of Compact Disc Players, 31 RAND J. ECON. 43 (2000).
23 See DIGITAL TORNADO, supra note 2, at 13-16 (giving a
brief history of the Internet); see also Robert H'obbes' Zakon,
Hobbes' Internet Timetine v4.1, at http://www.isoc.org/guest/
2003]
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ond ("Kbps") network created to enable long-dis-
tance access to five supercomputer centers across
the country.24 In 1987, a partnership of Merit Net-
work, Inc., IBM and MCI began to manage the
NSFNET, which became a T-1 network2 5 connect-
ing thirteen sites in 1988.26 The issue of intercon-
nection arose only when a number of commercial
backbones came into being and eventually sup-
planted the NSFNET.
27
At the time that commercial networks began
appearing, general commercial activity on the
NSFNET was prohibited by an Acceptable Use
Policy,28 thereby preventing these commercial
networks from exchanging traffic with one an-
other using the NSFNET as the backbone. 29 This
roadblock was circumvented in 1991, when a
number of commercial backbone operators in-
cluding PSINet, UUNET and CerfNET estab-
lished the Commercial Internet Exchange
("CIX"). 30 CIX consisted of a router, housed in
Santa Clara, California, that was set up for the
purpose of interconnecting these commercial
backbones and enabling them to exchange their
end users' traffic.3 ' In 1993, the NSF decided to
leave the management of the backbone entirely to
competing commercial backbones. 32 In order to
facilitate the growth of overlapping competing
backbones, the NSF designed a system of geo-
graphically dispersed Network Access Points
("NAPs") similar to CIX, each consisting of a
shared switch or local area network ("LAN") used
to exchange traffic.3 3 The four original NAPs
were in San Francisco (operated by PacBell), Chi-
cago (BellCore and Ameritech), New York
(SprintLink) and Washington, D.C. (MFS).3 4
Backbones could choose to interconnect with one
another at any or all of these NAPs. 35 In 1995, this
network of commercial backbones and NAPs per-
manently replaced the NSFNET.
36
zakon/internet/History/HIT.html [hereinafter Zakon].
24 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, NIFTr 50-THE IN-
TERNET, at http://www.nsf.gov/od/Ipa/nsf50/nsfoutreach/
htm/n50_z2/pages-z3/28_pg.htmn.
25 A T-1 network carries 1.544 megabits of data per sec-
ond ("Mbps").
26 DIGITAL TORNADO, supra note 2, at 13.
27 See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 191-200
(1999) [hereinafter ABBATE].
28 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, ACCEPTABLE USE POLI-




30 ABBATE, supra note 27, at 198.
Figure 1: Peering
The interconnection of commercial backbones
is not subject to any industry-specific regulations.
The NSF did not establish any interconnection
rules at the NAPs, and interconnection between
Internet backbone providers is not currently regu-
lated by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC" or "the Commission") or any other
government agency. 7 Instead, the backbones are
self-regulated through interconnection arrange-
ments evolved from the informal interactions that
characterized the Internet at the time the NSF was
running the backbone. The commercial back-
bones developed a system of interconnection
known as peering.3 8 Peering has a number of dis-
tinctive characteristics. First, peering partners
only exchange traffic that originates with the cus-
tomer of one backbone and terminates with the
customer of the other peered backbone. In Figure
1, customers of backbones A and C can trade traf-
fic as a result of a peering relationship between
the backbones, as can the customers of backbones
B and C, which also have a peering arrangement.
As part of a peering arrangement, however, a
backbone would not act as an intermediary-it
would accept the traffic of one peering partner
31 Id.
32 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, NSF AND THE IN-
TERNET: AN OVERVIEW, at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/news/
media/backgrl.htm [hereinafter NSF AND THE INTERNET].
33 Id.
34 MARCUS, supra note 2, at 277.
25 Id. at 276.
36 Id.
37 See generally Oxman, supra note 15 (discussing the
FCC's role in the Internet).
38 INTERMEDIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 10 (defining
peering as "the arrangement between two Internet service
providers to connect their networks, so that the customers of
one can communicate with those of the other").
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and transit this traffic to another peering part-
ner.39 Thus, referring back to Figure 1, backbone
C will not accept traffic from backbone A destined
for backbone B. The second distinctive character-
istic of peering is that peering partners exchange
traffic on a settlements-free basis. 40 The only costs
that backbones incur to peer are that each part-
ner pays for its own equipment and the transmis-
sion capacity needed for the two peers to meet at
each peering point.
sponse to the customer of ISP X on the East Coast.
A final characteristic of peering is that recipients
of traffic only promise to undertake "best efforts"
when terminating traffic, rather than guarantee-
ing any level of performance in delivering packets
received from peering partners.
43
Figure 3: Network Access Point
Figure 2: Hot-Potato Routing
Additional characteristics of peering relate to
the routing of information from one backbone to
another. Peering partners generally meet in a
number of geographically dispersed locations.
41
In order to decide where to pass traffic from one
backbone to another in a consistent and fair man-
ner, they have adopted what is known as "hot-po-
tato routing," whereby a backbone will pass traffic
to another backbone at the earliest point of ex-
change. 4 2 As an example, in Figure 2, backbones
A and B are interconnected on the West and East
Coasts. When a customer of ISP X on the East
Coast requests a web page from a site connected
to ISP Y on the West Coast, backbone A passes
this request to backbone B on the East Coast, and
backbone B carries this request to the West Coast.
Likewise, the responding web page is routed from
backbone B to backbone A on the West Coast,
and backbone A is responsible for carrying the re-
39 See, e.g., INTERMEDIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at
http://www.intermedia.com (providing a definition of peer-
ing).
40 This is similar to bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all ar-
rangements. See infra note 60.
41 INTERMEDIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 10.
42 See MARcus, supra note 2, at 283-285.
43 See DIGITAL ToRNADo, supra note 2, at 17-18.
44 MARcus, supra note 2, at 280-282.
The original system of peering has evolved over
time. Initially, most exchange of traffic under
peering arrangements took place at the NAPs, as
it was efficient for each backbone to interconnect
with as many backbones as possible at the same
location, as shown in the example in Figure 3.44
The rapid growth in Internet traffic soon caused
the NAPs to become congested, however, which
led to delayed and dropped packets. 4 5 For in-
stance, Intermedia Business Solutions asserts that
at one point packet loss at the Washington, D.C.
NAP reached up to 20 percent.46 As a result, a
number of new NAPs have appeared to reduce
the amount of traffic flowing through the original
NAPs. For example, MFS, now owned by
WorldCom, operates a number of NAPs known as
Metropolitan Area Exchanges ("MAEs"), includ-
ing one of the original NAPs, the Washington,
D.C. NAP known as MAE-East, as well as MAE-
West in San Jose and other MAEs in Los Angeles,
Dallas and Chicago.4
7
Another result of the increased congestion at
the NAPs has been that many backbones began to
45 A packet is "the unit of data that is routed between an
origin and a destination on the Internet." Whatis.com, at
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9-
gci2l2736,00.html (last modified Jul. 31, 2001).
46 INTERMEDIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 10.
47 See WORLOCOM, INTEROPERABILITy, at http://www.
worldcom.com/govt/federal_solutions/resource-guide/re-
dacted-contract/vol ltech/section2/2_1 -1 7.pdf.
20031
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Figure 4: Private Peering
interconnect directly with one another.48 This sys-
tem has come to be known as private peering, as
opposed to the public peering that takes place at
the NAPs. In Figure 4, backbones A and B have
established a private peering connection through
which they bypass the NAP when exchanging traf-
fic for each other - they both only use the NAP
when exchanging traffic with backbone C 49 This
system developed partly in response to congestion
at the NAPs, yet it may often be more cost-effec-
tive for the backbones.5 o For instance, if back-
bones were to interconnect only at the NAPs, traf-
fic that originated and terminated in the same city
but on different backbones would have to travel
to a NAP in a different city or even a different
country for exchange. 5' With private peering, in
contrast, the traffic can be exchanged within the
same city, thereby alleviating the strain on the
NAPs. At one point it was estimated that 80 per-
cent of Internet traffic was exchanged via private
peering.52 There are recent indications, however,
48 See MARCUS, supra note 2, at 280-282.
49 Private peering may take place in the same physical
location as the NAP. If two carriers wishing to peer privately
already have transport going to a NAP, they may simply by-
pass the NAP's switches and interconnect directly at the same
location. INTERMEDIA WIITE PAPER, supra note 10.
50 For instance, Intermedia states that its "dual peering
policy," combining open public peering with private peering,
"will create a win-win solution for everyone and a better man-
agement approach to the Internet." INTERMEDIA WHiVE PA-
PER, supra note 10.
51 For example, prior to the establishment of a NAP in
Rome backbones often exchanged domestic Italian Internet
traffic in the United States. Sam Paltridge, Internet Traffic Ex-
change: Developments and Policy, 22-23, at http://oecd.org/
pdf/M000014000?M000014288.pdf (Apr. 1, 1998) (This doc-
ument was prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Committee for Information,
Computer and Communications Policy.).
52 Michael Gaddis, Chief Technical Officer of SAVVIS
Communications, gave this estimate. Randy Barrett, ISP Sur-
that as NAPs begin to switch to Asynchronous
Transfer Mode ("ATM") 5 and other advanced
switch technologies, the NAPs will be able to pro-
vide higher quality services and may regain their
former attraction as efficient meeting points for
peering partners. 54 Unless specified, discussions
of peeing below refer to both public and private
peering.
Because each bilateral peering arrangement
only allows backbones to exchange traffic des-
tined for each others' customers, backbones need
a significant number of peering arrangements in
order to gain access to the full Internet. UUNET,
for instance, claims to "peer with 75 other ISPs
globally. " 55 As discussed below, there are few
backbones that rely solely on private or public
peering to meet their interconnection needs. The
alternative to peering is a transit arrangement be-
tween backbones, in which one backbone pays an-
other backbone to deliver traffic between its cus-
tomers and the customers of other backbones.
Transit and peering are differentiated in two
main ways. First, in a transit arrangement, one
backbone pays another backbone for intercon-
nection and therefore becomes a wholesale cus-
tomer of the other backbone. 56 Second, unlike in
a peering relationship, with transit, the backbone
selling the transit services will route traffic from
the transit customer to its peering partners. 57 In
Figure 5, backbone A is a transit customer of back-
bone C; thus, the customers of backbone A have
access both to the customers of backbone C as
well as to the customers of all peering partners of
backbone C, such as backbone B. If backbone A
vival Guide, at http://www.intweek.com (Dec. 7, 1998).
5-1 ATM is a "high bandwidth, low-delay, connection ori-
ented, packet-like switching and multiplexing technique."
NEAI'ON, supra note 17, at 67-69.
54 See MARCUS, supra note 2, at 278. Marcus states that "in
1998, MCI WorldCom upgraded its MAE facilities ... to offer
modern ATM switches as a high-capacity alternative to the
FDDI/gigaswitch architecture." Id. See also Letter from Attor-
neys for MCI WorldCom and Sprint to Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary, FCC, Attach. at 20-21 (Jan. 14, 2000) (filed in Ap-
plication for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses
from Sprint Corporation to MCI WorldCom, Inc., CC-Docket
99-333) [hereinafter MCI WorldCom Sprint Ex Parte) ("In
short, the deployment of ATM switches has expanded the ca-
pability of NAPs to handle the demand for public peering by
increasing the number of ports as well as the capacity availa-
ble at NAPs.").
55 MCI WorldCom Sprint Ex Pale, supra note 35, Attach.
at 20, n.48.
56 See generally, MARCUS, supra note 2.
57 Id.
[Vol. 11




and backbone C were peering partners, as in Fig-
ure 1, backbone C would not accept traffic from
backbone A that was destined for backbone B.
Many backbones have adopted a hybrid ap-
proach to interconnection, peering with a num-
ber of backbones and paying for transit from one
or more backbones in order to have access to the
backbone of the transit supplier as well as the
peering partners of the transit supplier.58 Those
few large backbones that interconnect solely by
peering, and do not need to purchase transit
from any other backbones, will be referred to
here as top-tier backbones. Because of the non-dis-
closure agreements that cover interconnection
between backbones, it is difficult to state with ac-
curacy the number of top-tier backbones. Accord-
ing to one industry participant, there are five:
Cable & Wireless, WorldCom, Sprint, AT&T and
Genuity (formerly GTE Internetworking).59
It is useful to compare Internet interconnection
arrangements of peering and transit with more fa-
58 Economides, supra note 16.
59 MARcus, supra note 2, at 280. Marcus is the Chief
Technology Officer of Genuity. Genuity was formerly GTE
Internetworking. In order to comply with Section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and thereby obtain Com-
mission approval to merge with Bell Atlantic, GTE agreed to
sell most of its equity in Genuity to the public through an
initial public offering. Press Release, GTE, Bell Atlantic and
GTE Chairmen Praise FCC Merger Approval (June 16, 2000).
In addition, according to Marcus, "somewhere between six
and perhaps thirty other ISPs could also be viewed as back-
bone ISPs." Marcus states that "the ability to reach all In-
ternet destinations without the need for a transit relation-
ship ... is a strong indicator that an ISP should be viewed as
a backbone ISP." MARcus, supra note 2, at 279. This is similar
to the definition used in this paper of a top-tier backbone.
60 In a bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all arrangement,
each carrier bills its own customers for the origination of traf-
fic and does not pay the other carrier for terminating this
traffic. In a settlement arrangement, on the other hand, the
miliar, traditional telephony interconnection ar-
rangements. The practice of peering is similar to
the practice of bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all
arrangements in telephony.60 Transit arrange-
ments between Internet backbones are somewhat
similar to resale arrangements between, for in-
stance, long distance carriers; the Internet back-
bone providing transit service acts as the whole-
saler, and the backbone buying transit acts as the
reseller of Internet backbone services. There are
notable differences in the way Internet and te-
lephony arrangements are regulated. The inter-
connection between Internet backbones is not
governed by industry-specific regulations,6' while
the interconnection of traditional telephone car-
riers is currently regulated both domestically and
internationally. 62 Furthermore, unlike telephony,
there is no difference between domestic and in-
ternational Internet interconnection arrange-
ments; backbones treat each other the same re-
gardless of the country of origin or location of
customer base.
63
There is no accepted convention that governs
when two backbones will or should decide to peer
with one another, nor is it an easy matter to devise
one. The term "peer" suggests equality, 64 and one
convention could be that backbones of equal size
would peer. However, there are many measures of
backbone size, such as geographic spread, capac-
ity, traffic volume or number of customers. It is
unlikely that two backbones will be similar along
many or all dimensions. One may have fewer, but
larger, customers than the other, another may
reach into Europe or Asia, and so forth. The ques-
carrier on which the traffic originates pays the other carrier
to terminate the traffic. If traffic flow between the two net-
works is balanced, the net settlement that each pays is zero,
and therefore a bill-and-keep arrangement may be preferred
because the networks do not have to incur costs to measure
and track traffic or to develop billing systems. As an example,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows for incumbent
local exchange carriers to exchange traffic with competitors
using a bill-and-keep arrangement. 47 U.S.C. §252
(d) (2)(B)(i) (2000). See also infra note 184.
61 See infra Section II. D.
62 See generally Communications Act of 1934, as amended
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §251
(2000).
63 See, e.g., infra Section 1I. C.
64 The definition of peer is "one that is of the same or
equal standing (as in law, rank, quality, age, ability) with an-




tion then becomes, how the backbones weigh one
variable against another. Given the complexity of
such judgments, it may be best to use a definition
of equality proposed by one industry partici-
pant-that companies will peer when they per-
ceive equal benefit from peering based on their
own subjective terms, rather than any objective
terms. 65 In sum, peering agreements are the re-
sult of commercial negotiations; each backbone
bases its decisions on whether, how and where to
peer by weighing the benefits and costs of enter-
ing into a particular interconnection agreement
with another backbone. Currently, there are no
industry-specific regulations governing intercon-
nection that Internet backbone providers must
weigh as part of the costs in their decision to peer.
D. The Backbone as an Unregulated Service
The Federal Communications Commission
maintains a policy to "focus on sustaining compet-
itive communications markets and protecting the
public interest where markets fail to do so."66 As
an example of this policy, for many years the FCC
has recognized a categorical distinction between
regulated telecommunications services and unreg-
ulated computer-based services.6 7 To understand
why Internet backbone services are, and should
continue to be, treated as unregulated computer-
based services, it is important to highlight two ba-
sic policies. First, it is important to understand the
basis for the regulation of network industries. For
the telecommunications network, like the railroad
and the telegraph before it, to grow into a healthy
and vibrant universally available network, striking
a "common carrier" bargain with telephone com-
65 Geoff Huston, Interconnection, Peering and Settlements, 3-
4, at http://www.telstra.net/gih/peerdocs/peer.html (Jan.
1999); see also MARcus, supra note 2, at 279 ("Over time, it
came to be recognized that peers need not be similar in size;
rather, what was important was that there be comparable
value in the traffic exchanged.").
66 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, A NEW FCC
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Draft Strategic Plan, 3 (August 1999),
http://www.fcc.gov/21st-century (Aug. 1999).
67 See, e.g. Oxman, supra note 15.
68 Id.
69 See infra note 74.
70 Economides, supra note 16, at 11.
71 Oxman, supra note 15, at 9.
72 Id. at 9 (stating, "[t] hus, data processing services were
'unregulated' from the outset, permitting the data industry
to develop innovative services exempt from the numerous
common carrier requirements of Title II of the Communica-
tions Act").
panies was a beneficial government interven-
tion. 68 In addition, given the economies of scale 69
inherent in the construction of the telecommuni-
cations network, natural monopoly regulation was
necessary to ensure reasonable price and quality
levels. 70 Second, it is important to understand why
certain services are not regulated as common car-
rier services. Soon after their introduction, the
FCC determined that the computer-based services
market would remain competitive, and therefore
should not be regulated, so long as an essential
input to such services - telecommunications capa-
bility - was available to providers of such services
on a nondiscriminatory basis. 71 Thus it was not
necessary to impose common carrier regulations
on the users of those telecommunications services
as well as the providers. 72 The following is a brief
overview of relevant domestic telecommunica-
tions regulations.
73
1. Common Carrier Regulation
The traditional rationale for regulating network
industries, such as telecommunications, was the
almost overwhelming economies of scale in the
provision of such services.74 Economic theory and
practice suggests that a natural monopolist is
likely to arise in such industries; this is considered
efficient to the extent that duplicative facilities are
not installed.75 However, without competitors, a
natural monopoly can harm consumers in a vari-
ety of ways, which fall generally into three catego-
ries: (1) the monopolist can directly raise retail
prices and/or reduce retail service quality; (2) the
monopolist can leverage market power into re-
lated markets that would otherwise be competi-
73 See also GERALD R. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POE-
ICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETI-
TION (1994) [hereinafter BROCK]; INGO VOGELSANG &
BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION:
THE LAST TEN MILES (1997) [hereinafter VOGELSANG &
MITCHELL].
74 Economies of scale arise when the cost per unit of pro-
viding service decreases as output increases. ROBERT S.
PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 223 (4th
ed. 1995) [hereinafter PINDYCK & RUBINFELD]. In wireline te-
lephony, it was felt that the cost of having one company serve
a particular area was historically much lower than having two
or more companies with partial or full overbuilds of each
others' networks. VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 73, at
51-55. Lately, new technologies have altered the traditional
cost structures in a number of network industries such as te-
lephony, which enabled the pro-competitive, deregulatory
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
75 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 74, at 352-358.
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tive; 76 and (3) the monopolist can deny access to
its network and thus bar entry into its core mar-
kets.
7 7
Governments worldwide traditionally chose to
operate or regulate natural monopolies in order
to benefit from the efficiencies inherent in having
a single provider, while not incurring the corre-
sponding harms that the natural monopolies
could inflict on consumers.78 In the United States,
certain telecommunications providers have been
subject to natural monopoly regulation;79 this
meant a government grant of monopoly (the mo-
nopoly granted to local telephone companies, for
example, was lifted by Congress in 1996), along
with rate and service quality regulation. In addi-
tion, all telecommunications providers, even
those not subject to natural monopoly regulation,
are regulated as common carriers, as described
below. It should be noted that the goals of regula-
tion are similar to those of antitrust policy-both
seek to protect consumers from firms with market
power. Indeed, in the United States, federal anti-
trust actions have had at least as great an impact
on telecommunications as federal regulations.80
Broadly speaking, in the United States, regulatory
approaches have been used to control firms' ac-
tions while taking the market structure as given;
antitrust policy has been used to control firms' ac-
tions by acting on the market structure itself, such
as by reviewing mergers that would increase mar-
ket concentration, inducing a divestiture aimed at
reducing concentration or preventing firms from
taking actions that cripple market mechanisms.8'
For the public, the combinational use of both ap-
proaches benefited the construction of a nation-
76 For instance, local wireline services are necessary in-
puts in the provision of wireless and long distance services; a
carrier with market power over local services could leverage
this market power into these related markets.
77 Economides, supra note 16, at 11-13.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 73, at 63-64.
81 In telecommunications, the FCC, the federal agency
charged with regulating interstate communications by wire
and radio, has authority pursuant to the Communications
Act of 1934 to determine whether transactions involving the
transfer of certain licenses or authorizations serve the public
interest. See In re Applications of Ameritech Corp., Trans-
feror, and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee, For Con-
sent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commis-
sion Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d)
of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95
and 101 of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion and
wide telecommunications network while ensuring
affordable access to all users.
Government involvement in the nascent tele-
phone market began at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury. Even before the passage of the Communica-
tions Act in 1934, the Supreme Court ruled that
telegraph companies had a duty - arising out of
the common law - to serve all customers in a non-
discriminatory manner as a common carrier.8 2 In
addition, thirty-four states determined that man-
dating interconnection obligations was the best
way to resolve disputes that had arisen between
1894 and 1906 between the Bell System, the larg-
est telephone company at the time, and smaller
independent telephone companies.8 3 It was not
until 1910 that the Mann-Elkins Act extended the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to include telephone companies.8 4 In 1913,
in response to a threatened antitrust case, AT&T
entered into an agreement, known as the Kings-
bury Commitment, to interconnect with indepen-
dent local telephone companies for long distance
calls. 85 In 1934, Congress established the Federal
Communications Commission to regulate tele-
communications common carriers.
86
Today, pursuant to the Communications Act, as
amended, communications common carriers
must offer service on demand to the public at
large without unreasonable discrimination; in ex-
change, there is protection from certain types of
liability. 87 Common carriers with market power
are subject to additional regulations that restrict
rates and govern service quality levels.88 In order
to prevent common carriers with market power
from leveraging this market power into related
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14712, paras. 46-54 (1999). The Commis-
sion also shares concurrent antitrust jurisdiction with the De-
partment of Justice ("DOJ") under the Clayton Act to review
mergers between common carriers. Id. at para. 53.
82 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181
U.S. 92, 99-104 (1901).
83 Zakon, supra note 23.
84 Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539
(1910).
85 See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 73, at 64.
86 The Communications Act of 1934, the FCC's enabling
statute, created the Commission "for the purpose of regulat-
ing interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio." 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000). The Communica-
tions Act defines a common carrier as "any person engaged
as a common carrier for hire." 47 U.S.C. §153(h) (2000).





competitive markets, including long distance and
the manufacture of consumer premise equipment
("CPE"), there has been a wide range of regula-
tions, including outright divestiture and prohibi-
tion on entering these related markets.8 9 As com-
petition is introduced into formerly monopolized
telecommunications markets such as local teleph-
ony, regulation is nevertheless required in order
to encourage the incumbent monopolist to open
its network fully to potential entrants.
Over the years, technological advances have al-
tered the cost structure upon which natural mo-
nopoly regulation rested.90 The regulatory re-
sponse in the United States has been to relax reg-
ulation in markets where competition has elimi-
nated the need for regulation, while protecting
these markets from firms with market power in re-
lated segments of the industry.9' As an example,
after upstarts such as MCI demonstrated that
competition was possible in the provision of long
distance services, an antitrust case brought by the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") culminated in the
breakup of the Bell System into AT&T, providing
long distance services in a competitive market,
and the seven Regional Bell Operating Compa-
nies ("RBOCs"), providing local services in exclu-
sive regions. 92 The RBOCs were prohibited from
entering long distance markets in order to pre-
vent discrimination towards unaffiliated long dis-
tance carriers that led to the breakup of the Bell
System in the first place. 93 Recently, as competi-
tion became possible in local markets, Congress
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act"), 94 requiring incumbent Local Ex-
change Carriers ("LECs"), such as the RBOCs and
GTE, to open their local markets to competition
89 VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 73, at 61-62.
90 For instance, microwave technology made it possible
for MCI to compete with AT&T in long distance. See BROCK,
supra note 73, at 111-115.
91 See, e.g., In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authori-
zations Therefore, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, para.
54 (1980) ("Application of current regulatory procedures to
non-dominant carriers imposes unnecessary and counter-
productive regulatory constraints upon a marketplace that
can satisfy consumer demand efficiently without government
intervention."). See also In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be
Reclassified as a Non-dominant Carrier, Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
3271 (1995) (determining that AT&T should be declared
non-dominant).
92 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). See also, VOGELSANG & MITCHELL,
supra note 73, at 67-69; BROCK, supra note 73, at Ch. 9.
93 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co, 552 F. Supp.
by a variety of means. 95 These requirements are
crucial to the development of a competitive tele-
communications network, and the Federal Com-
munications Commission rules implementing
these requirements will be relaxed as competition
renders them unnecessary.96
In summary, telecommunications providers are
subject to common carrier regulations that ensure
nondiscriminatory access to end users. Together
with antitrust enforcement, these regulations also
serve to protect against anti-competitive behavior
by telecommunications providers with market
power. In markets where competition can act in
place of regulation as the means to protect con-
sumers from the exercise of market power, the
Commission has long chosen to abstain from im-
posing regulation. For this reason, providers of
services that combine telecommunications with
computer services are not regulated as common
carriers.
2. Basic versus Enhanced Services
For more than thirty years, the Commission has
sought to avoid imposing unnecessary common
carrier regulation on providers of computer ser-
vices that rely on the nation's telecommunications
infrastructure for transmission of those services
but do not themselves provide telecommunica-
tions services to the public. The absence of mar-
ket power in the computer services industry led
the Commission to conclude that imposing com-
mon carrier regulation was unnecessary and
might discourage innovation and distort the nas-
cent data marketplace. 97 The Commission instead
focused on ensuring that the providers of the un-
131 (D.D.C. 1982).
94 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
95 The 1996 Act provides for three types of competition:
facilities-based competition, competition using network ele-
ments unbundled (leased) from the incumbent at cost-based
rates and competition reselling the incumbent's service. See
47 U.S.C. §251 (2000). To ensure that the customers of the
competitors remain plugged into the network, section 251 of
the 1996 Act requires that incumbent LECs offer nondiscrim-
inatory interconnection terms and conditions to competitors.
See 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000). Absent such a requirement, in-
cumbents would be able to deny competitors access to their
monopoly networks.
96 Upon a showing that local markets are open to compe-
tition, the RBOCs are granted authority to enter the market
for long distance services, pursuant to section 271 of the 1996
Act. 47 U.S.C. §271 (2000).
97 See generally Oxman, supra note 15.
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derlying telecommunications services made these
services available on a non-discriminatory basis
and did not themselves leverage their market
power into the provision of these complementary
computer services. 08 As a result, the competitive
enhanced services market was able to flourish
without onerous regulations impeding its growth.
In 1966, the Commission opened the Computer
Inquiry proceeding that explored the regulatory
and policy issues raised by the nascent interde-
pendence of computer and communication tech-
nologies.99 In announcing the inquiry, the Com-
mission foreshadowed the incredible attributes of
computer networks that would make the Internet
such a valuable tool.
The modern day electronic computer is capa-
ble of being programmed to furnish a wide variety
of services, including the processing of all kinds of
data and the gathering, storage forwarding and
retrieval of information - technical, statistical,
medical, cultural, among numerous other classes.
With its huge capacity and versatility, the com-
puter is capable of providing its services to a mul-
tiplicity of users at locations remote from the
computer. Effective use of the computer is, there-
fore, becoming increasingly dependent upon
communication common carrier facilities and ser-
vices by which the computers and the user are
given instantaneous access to each other. 10°
In the early 1970s, the Commission determined
that there were "no natural or economic barriers
to free entry into the market for [computer] ser-
vices." 0 1 The Commission therefore decided that
the policies and objectives of the Communica-
tions Act would best be served by allowing com-
puter services to operate in an environment free
from industry-specific regulation.10 2 In addition,
the Commission devised rules that require com-
98 Id.
99 Id. at 8.
100 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by
the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Ser-
vices and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, para. 1
(1966).
101 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by
the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Ser-
vices and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, para.
18 (1970).
102 Oxman, supra note 15, at 9.
103 In re MTS and WATS Market Share, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711-722 (1985).
104 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by
the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Ser-
vices and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267,
mon carriers to grant nondiscriminatory access to
their networks to enhanced service providers. 0 3
Mandating such nondiscrimination, the Commis-
sion concluded, was necessary because the com-
puter-based service industry "cannot survive,
much less develop further, except through reli-
ance upon and use of communications facilities
and services."'
10 4
In order to facilitate the implementation of its
computer services policy, the Commission created
the categories of "basic" and "enhanced" ser-
vices. 0 5 The basic services category denotes com-
mon carrier services subject to Tide II of the Com-
munications Act. 10 6 The enhanced services cate-
gory denotes those services offered over common
carrier transmission facilities used in interstate
communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format,
content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the
subscriber's transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different or restructured in-
formation; or involve subscriber interaction with
stored information.
10 7
Thus, a basic service is a communications path-
way, like a telephone line, while an enhanced ser-
vice is a computer-enhanced offering that oper-
ates via that communications pathway. Present
day examples of unregulated enhanced services
include voicemail services, gateway services, elec-
tronic publishing and Internet services. In these
markets, competition between firms rather than
any industry-specific regulations ensures that con-
sumers enjoy low prices and increased growth in
innovative services on the Internet.
E. Growth of the Internet Industry
In the past five years, the Internet has exper-
para. 7 (1971).
105 The 1996 Act introduced new provisions referring to
"telecommunications service" and "information service." For
definitions of these services, see 47 U.S.C. §§153(46), 153(20)
(2000), respectively. The Commission has concluded that
these definitions correspond to the categories of basic and
enhanced services, respectively. For a general discussion, see
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to
Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501 (1998).
106 Basic services are defined as a common carrier offer-
ing of a pure "transmission capacity for the movement of in-
formation." In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer In-
quiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 5 (1980) [herein-
after Second Computer Inquiry].
107 47 C.F.R. §64.702(a) (2001).
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ienced unprecedented growth rates.'1 8 The mar-
ket for Internet backbone services has grown
since privatization in 1995 into a market with a
multitude of competing providers.") 9 According
to Boardwatch magazine, the number of Internet
backbone providers rose steadily in the late 90's
to reach forty-two national backbones by 1999.'1o
Boardwatch defines a national backbone to be one
"maintaining a hub city in at least five different
states, spanning both coasts, and peering at the
major NAPs."'1 1' The list of national backbones in-
cludes the top-tier backbones that only peer with
other backbones, as well as other smaller national
backbones that peer with some backbones and
purchase transit from others. Due to the non-dis-
closure agreements covering contracts between
backbones, it is impossible to know the exact
breakdown between the number of top-tier back-
bones and other national backbones, although
there are suggestions that there are five top-tier
backbones. 
12
The list of national backbones includes a num-
ber of backbones that pre-date the privatization of
the Internet, as well as a number of newer players
that have entered partly on the strength of their
new fiber facilities.'" Many of the older back-
bones have been swept into the merger wave that
transformed the general communications indus-
try and, combined with their merger partners, re-
main among the largest backbones. WorldCom
now owns UUNET and ANS Communications,
two of the earliest backbones, along with GridNet,
Unicom-Pipex, InNet, NL Net and Metrix Inter-
link.114 WorldCom also owns MFS, which runs the
108 Larry Press, The State of the Internet: Crowth and Caps, at
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/inet/O0/cdproceed-
ings/8e/8e_4htm Uune 30, 2000).
109 The analysis contained in this paper is based solely
on publicly available information. As in most markets, infor-
mation about Internet backbone prices and costs is proprie-
tary. In addition, information about the nature of relation-
ships between Internet backbone providers is protected by
non-disclosure agreements. The effects of these non-disclo-
sure agreements on this analysis are described below.
110 In 1999, Boardwatch actually listed forty-three national
backbones; however, for purposes of this paper we count as
one backbone the two backbones listed as owned by MCI
WorldCom-Advanced Networks and UUNET. In addition,
Boardwatch does not include in its list five other national
backbones, Williams Communications, Bell Canada/Bell
Nexxia, Network Two, ITC DeltaCom and RoadRunner, be-
cause these backbones would not release their prices. For
consistency with Boardwatch's previous lists, these backbones
are not accounted for here. Boardwatch Magazine's Directory of
Internet Service Providers, 5 (11 th ed. 1999).
NAPs known as MAEs, including one of the origi-
nal NAPs, MAE East. 1 5 According to the Depart-
ment of Justice, UUNET is now "by far the largest
provider of Internet backbone services in the
world, whether measured by traffic or reve-
nues."'1 6 In 1997, GTE Internetworking, since
renamed Genuity, purchased BBN, the developer
of a precursor to the modern day Internet, and
was then spun off as a separate public corpora-
tion." 7 AT&T's role in the backbone market has
grown with its purchases of CERFnet, another
early backbone, along with IBM's Global Network
business." 18 Cable & Wireless entered the ranks of
the largest backbones when it purchased MCI's
Internet backbone, which was divested during the
MCI WorldCom merger proceeding. 19 Finally,
PSINet, an early backbone that has remained in-
dependent, also remains among the list of the
larger backbones, although PSINet recently filed
for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection.'
2 1 1
The increase in the number of backbones has
been facilitated by the recent dramatic increases
in the availability of fiber optic capacity. Not only
have the fiber networks owned by the incumbent
carriers-AT&T, Sprint and MCI WorldCom-all
grown in recent years, a more significant increase
in capacity comes from four entrants-Qwest,
Broadwing (formerly IXC), Williams and Level
3-that have built or are building nationwide fi-
ber optic networks.121 Not only are these four
companies themselves national Internet back-
bones, but also a number of other backbones
have in turn bought or leased capacity from them.
For instance, PSINet purchased sixteen fibers cov-
I I Boardwatch Magazine Directory of Internet Service Provid-
ers, 27 (9th ed. 1997).
112 See infra at note 59.
1 13 See Boardwatch Magazine's Directory of Internet Service
Providers (llth ed. 1999)(providing a complete list and
description of national backbone providers).
114 See Complaint at 6, US v. WorldCom, Inc. and Sprint
Corp. (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter DOJ WorldCom Sprint
Complaint].
115 WORLDCOM, INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1997).
116 Id. at 4-5.
117 See infra at note 59.
'11 AT&T Business, "Twenty-first Century iVetworking," at
http://www.ipservices.att.com/realstories/databriefs/fea-
ttires/30_21c.cfin.
'19 See infra note 131.
120 PSINet Files for Chapter 11, REUTERS NEWSWIRE,June 1,
2001.
121 IXC Communications merged with Cincinnati Bell to
become Broadwing Inc.
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ering 14,000 miles from the former IXC Commu-
nications. 122 The development of dense wave-
length division multiplexing ("DWDM") technol-
ogies, which divide each strand of fiber into multi-
ple channels, is further increasing the availability
of fiber capacity by multiplying the capacity of ex-
isting and new networks.' 23 Entry into the back-
bone market is facilitated by this increasing availa-
bility of fiber capacity from a growing number of
providers.
The growth in private Internet backbones has
coincided with the introduction of the World
Wide Web, which has popularized the Internet for
millions of consumers. The result is a virtuous cy-
cle that is typical of industries characterized by
network externalities. In this case, users, drawn to
the Internet by applications such as the World
Wide Web, encourage the creation of more Web
content, which in turn encourages additional
users to log on to the Internet.124 New users, and
new providers of content, require Internet access,
encouraging the creation of more ISPs, which in
turn encourages the entry of more Internet back-
bone providers and fiber providers to transport
the additional data. These ISPs compete to attract
new users and content providers in a continuation
of the virtuous cycle that has led to the unprece-
dented growth level that characterizes the In-
ternet.
In recognition of the role of regulatory absten-
tion in the development of the Internet, the 1996
Act states "[t]he Internet ... [has] flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation."'125 Yet, the commercial
backbone market is relatively young, and industry
observers are questioning whether the govern-
ment can, or should, maintain a fully hands-off
approach to backbone providers. 126 Competition,
hand-in-hand with antitrust laws and competition
enforcement, will act to restrain any anti-competi-
tive actions in place of industry-specific regula-
tions.
III. INTERCONNECTION ISSUES
There have been a number of allegations, dis-
122 With Series of Deals, PSINet seeks to become 'Super Carrier,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Oct. 20, 1999.
123 NEWrON, supra note 17, at 247.
124 See infra Section II. B.
125 47 U.S.C. §230 (a)(4) (2000). Furthermore, "[it] is
the policy of the United States to preserve the vibrant and
cussed below, that the entire system of intercon-
nection between backbones is at risk due to the
actions of several larger backbones. At least one
industry observer argued that the emerging sys-
tem of private peering enables the larger back-
bones to act in an anti-competitive manner by ex-
cluding smaller backbones from private peering
arrangements and then raising prices. 12 7 Univer-
sal connectivity is the norm today, but as new real-
time services begin to be offered over the In-
ternet, there are fears that backbones may choose
to differentiate themselves by not interconnecting
for purposes of offering these new services. How-
ever, there is hardly any possible market failure in
the Internet backbone market that could not be
governed adequately by existing antitrust laws.
A. Internet Backbone Market Power Issues
1. Background
Internet backbone providers face conflicting in-
centives. On one hand, they have an incentive to
cooperate with one another in order to provide
their customers with access to the full range of In-
ternet users and content. On the other hand,
these same backbones have an incentive to com-
pete with one another for both retail and whole-
sale customers. The need for backbone A to inter-
connect with backbone B in order to provide its
customers access to backbone B's customers cre-
ates what might be termed a competitive network ex-
ternality; this interconnection also enables back-
bone B to provide its customers access to back-
bone A s customers. As long as A and B are of ap-
proximately equal size, there is a strong incentive
for them to cooperate with one another in spite of
competitive network externalities; if either unilat-
erally stops interconnecting, it has no guarantees
that it will benefit from such an action. This situa-
tion seems to characterize the early days of the
commercial Internet, when a number of back-
bones were relatively similar in size and readily
agreed to peer with one another. Recently, how-
ever, there have been allegations that as certain
backbones grew they began to engage in uncoop-
competitive free market that presently exists for the In-
ternet." Id. at (b)(2).
126 See infra Section III. A. 1.
127 Jack Rickard, Yet Another Unique Moment in Time. Peer-
ing Redux - Back to the Future and the Essentials of a Competitive
Internet, Editor's Notes, BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE, May 1998.
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erative, if not anti-competitive, practices. 12
In early 1997, UUNET, followed by several
other large backbones, attempted to end peering
with a number of smaller backbones and instead
charge them for transit. 12 9 In another example,
GTE Internetworking, since renamed Genuity, an-
nounced that it would no longer privately peer
with Exodus Communications, as did PSINet
more recently. 13 When WorldCom, which had
purchased UUNET and several other backbones,
announced a merger agreement with MCI, there
was concern that the combined backbone would
become the dominant backbone with the ability
to exercise market power against smaller competi-
tors in a variety of ways.'"' In particular, merger
opponents argued that the merged firm would re-
fuse to peer with smaller backbones. 132 These
concerns were echoed in the recent MCI
WorldCom/Sprint merger proceeding.133 During
this proceeding, Level 3 argued that Sprint was re-
fusing to peer with it, a refusal that "cannot be
explained by competitive market forces."' Like-
wise, when Exodus was refused peering by PSINet,
Adam Wegner, General Counsel for Exodus
stated that "[Exodus] view[s] [PSINet's] action as
anti-competitive."
1 35
128 For instance, Level 3's Chairman, James Crowe,
claimed that MCI and WorldCom's refusal to peer with Level
3 constituted "monopolistic behavior." Joan Engebretson,
Level 3: Whiner or Visionary, TELEPHONV MAGAZINE, May 25,
1998, at 7 [hereinafter Engebretson]; see also John J. Keller,
Level 3 Assails the WorldCom-MCl Deal, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1998, at B1O.
129 Because interconnection agreements are generally
confidential due to the widespread use of non-disclosure
agreements, it is not commonly known whether this attempt
was successful. See Engebretson, supra note 128, at 7..
11o Kate Gerwig, Service Providers Still in Peering Dither, IN-
TERNETWEEK, Aug. 27, 1998, at http://www.internetwk.com/
news0898/news082798-2.htm [hereinafter Gerwig]; Martin
Kady II, Peer Pressure: Dissolution of PSINet, Exodus Network-Shar-
ing Agreement May be Sign of Things to Come, WASH. Bus.J.,June
2, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Kady].
131 See In re Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI
Communications Corporation for Transfer of Control of
MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom, Inc., Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 18025, 18103-18115,
paras. 142-156 (1998) [hereinafter MCI/WorldCom Order].
In order to satisfy antitrust concerns regarding increased
concentration in the Internet backbone market, MCI sold its
Internet assets to Cable & Wireless. See Press Release, Euro-
pean Commission, Commission Clears WorldCom and MCI
Merger Subject to Conditions (July 8, 1998) [hereinafter Eu-
ropean Commission MCI WorldCom Press Release]; Press
Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Clears
WorldCom/MCI Merger After MCI Agrees to Sell its Internet
Business (July 15, 1998) [hereinafter DQ MCI WorldCom
Press Release]; MCI/WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd at
Notwithstanding Exodus' views, a backbone's
refusal to peer with another backbone may not be
anti-competitive. Anti-competitive is defined to
mean the ability of a firm (or firms) to maintain
prices profitably above the level that would other-
wise result from a competitive market. The search
for anti-competitive actions focuses on actions
that harm consumers, but do not necessarily harm
competitors, for actions that harm competitors
may not in fact harm consumers. 36 For instance,
a merger may increase the efficiency of a firm and
result in lower retail prices. While this may harm
competitors, if many rivals remain in the market
the merger is not anti-competitive, because lower
prices benefit consumers. If a market failure is
found to lead to anti-competitive actions on the
part of one or more Internet backbone providers,
a determination must then be made whether anti-
trust laws would provide a sufficient remedy or if
industry-specific regulation is required.
The effect of a backbone's refusal to peer with
another backbone depends on the degree of com-
petition in the backbone market. In a competitive
market, a backbone may refuse to peer with a
smaller rival for legitimate, rather than anti-com-
petitive, reasons. 137 Nevertheless, backbones that
18109-18115, paras. 151-156. The Federal Communications
Commission did conclude, however, that "peering is likely to
remain an issue that warrants monitoring." Id. at 18115, para.
155.
1:_32 For instance, Level 3 argued that both MCI and
WorldCom were refusing to peer with Level 3 and that the
merger would increase the merger partners' incentives to dis-
criminate against rivals seeking to interconnect. See Letter
from Terrence J. Ferguson, Senior Vice President and Gen-
eral Counsel, Level 3 Communications, to Magalie Roman
Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attach. (May 29, 1998) (filed in In re
Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications
Corporation for Transfer of Control of MCI Communica-
tions Corporation to WorldCom, Inc.) [hereinafter Level 3
May 29, 1998 Ex Parte].
13" DOJ WorldCom Sprint Complaint, supra note 114, at
14-21.
134 Reply Comments of Level 3 Communications to the
Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Li-
censes from Sprint Corporation to MCI WorldCom, Inc. in
CC-Docket No. 99-333, at 11 (March 20, 2000).
135 Kady, supra note 130, at 3.
1-6 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
137 Here we focus on reasons to deny peering that have
their roots in economic considerations. Peering may also be
denied for technical reasons, as a peer could be exposed to
significant harms resulting from errors on the part of peer-
ing partners. A backbone with little technical competence
may find willing peering partners scarce for technical reasons
alone.
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have been denied peering can enter the back-
bone market, because competition among the
larger top-tier backbones gives them an incentive
to provide transit arrangements to smaller back-
bones in place of peering. If, on the other hand,
there was a dominant backbone, the dominant
backbone might be able to disadvantage actual or
potential rivals in an anti-competitive manner by,
for instance, not peering or not providing transit
to smaller backbones.
2. Analysis
a. Competitive Backbone Market
An important determinant of the competitive-
ness of any market is whether new firms can enter
the market and smaller firms can expand, thereby
constraining any potential exercise of market
power by the existing larger firms.' 3 8 In order to
enter or expand, Internet backbones need to in-
terconnect with existing backbones in order to
enable their customers to exchange traffic with
the customers of existing firms, and they need ac-
cess to fiber capacity to carry this traffic.' 3 9 Much
of the current debate focuses on the effects of one
backbone refusing to peer with another back-
bone. Nevertheless, in a competitive backbone
market, there may be a number of legitimate rea-
sons, as discussed below, for one backbone to re-
fuse to peer with another backbone. Therefore,
such a refusal may not constitute a barrier to en-
tering the backbone market. As long as transit ar-
rangements are available on a competitive basis,
smaller backbones can enter and ensure that the
backbone market remains competitive.
One reason a backbone may refuse to peer is
138 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/
hmgl.html (Apr. 8, 1997).
139 As described above, fiber capacity is readily available,
and thus this Section will focus on the ability of smaller In-
ternet backbones to interconnect with larger ones.
140 For instance, UUNET's North American Peering Pol-
icy states, among other things, that "[t]he Requester [of
peering] shall operate [certain] facilities in at least 50% of
the geographic region in which the WorldCom Internet Net-
work with which it desires to interconnect operates such facil-
ities" and that "in the United States, at a minimum, the Re-
quester must have the ability to meet WorldCom's Internet
Network at an East Coast location, a West Coast location, and
at least two Midwest locations." WORLDCOM, WORLDCOM Pot,
ICY FOR SETrLEMENT-FREE INTERCONNECTION WITH INTERNET
NETWORKS, at http://www.uu.net/peering (Jan. 2001) [here-
. .Request
-- - Response
Figure 6: Example of Free Riding
that peering would enable the other backbone to
free ride on its infrastructure investments. Figure
6 illustrates this situation. In the figure, backbone
B, a national backbone, has a presence on both
coasts. Backbone A, in contrast, is a regional back-
bone with a presence only on the East Coast. If
the two backbones peered on the East Coast,
when a customer of backbone A requests a web
page from a customer of backbone B whose server
is on the West Coast, then backbone B would
carry the request from the East Coast to the West
Coast and also carry the response back to the East
Coast. The national backbone may thus refuse to
peer on the grounds that it would otherwise bear
the expense for a national infrastructure from
which the regional carrier could then benefit at
no cost. As a result of such considerations, a num-
ber of backbones require that peering partners be
willing and able to interconnect at a number of
geographically diverse locations. 140 This consider-
ation seems to have motivated UUNET's decision
inafter WORLDCOM PEERING POLICY]. Sprint's Bi-Lateral Peer-
ing Policy contains a similar provision, stating that peering
partners must be able to support peering arrangements "at 4
geographically diverse domestic U.S. locations." Letter from
Michael G. Jones, Counsel, Sprint, to Magalie R. Salas, Secre-
tary, FCC, Attach., (April 13, 2000) filed in Application for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from Sprint
Corporation to MCI WorldCom, Inc. [hereinafter Sprint
Peering Policy]. Finally, Genuity recently published its In-
ternet Interconnect Guidelines. Press Release, Genuity,
Genuity Announces Public Posting of Interconnect Guide-
lines, (Sept. 8, 2000). One of the criteria for public peering
with Genuity is a presence at three or more Shared Intercon-
nection Points (NAPs) where Genuity has a presence, two of
which must be MAE-East and MAE-West. GENUITY, INTERNET
INTERCONNECTION GUIDELINES FOR GENUITY, at http://www.
genuity.com/infrastructure/interconnection.htm [hereinaf-
ter GENUITY INTERCONNECTION GUIDELINES].
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to change its peering policy in 1997.14 1
Another reason for refusal results from the
"hot-potato routing" that characterizes peering ar-
rangements, which may also lead to actual or per-
ceived free-riding, as a result of the specialized
backbones providing service mainly to one type of
customer, such as content providers. This situa-
tion can be illustrated by referring back to Figure
2. Suppose that ISP Y, a customer of backbone B,
provides service mainly to content providers,
while ISP X, a customer of backbone A, provides
service mainly to end users. Given hot-potato rout-
ing, when an end user customer of ISP X requests
content that is hosted by ISP Y, backbone B will
carry the request from the East Coast to the West
Coast, while backbone A would carry the re-
quested content back from the West Coast. As a
rule, content such as Web pages involve more bits
of data than the corresponding requests for the
content. Therefore, backbones such as A that
carry the Web pages would transport more traffic
than would backbones such as B that carry the re-
quests for these Web pages. Backbones may thus
refuse to peer with backbones hosting a high pro-
portion of content providers on the grounds that
they are bearing the expense for more capacity
than the backbone that is actually hosting the
content that utilizes this capacity. 42 This consid-
eration may have motivated GTE Internetworking
(now Genuity) and PSINet to refuse to peer with
Exodus, a company that provides network services
to content providers.143
The preceding paragraphs show that, in order
to prevent free-riding, a large backbone may re-
fuse to peer with a smaller backbone. In a compet-
141 At the time, the president and CEO of UUNET, John
Sidgmore, argued that "a few years ago all ISPs were gener-
ally the same size and used each other's infrastructures to a
more or less equal extent... that situation no longer exists
and consequently there are many cases where peering is not
appropriate." Press Release, UUNET, UUNET Details Peer-
ing Strategy, at http://www.us.uu.net/press/1997/peering.
shtml (May 12, 1997) [hereinafter UUNET May 12, 1997
Press Release].
142 UUNET, for one, argues that companies that provide
"web server farm" services and request peering with UUNET
are "seeking to use UUNET's network for free, after UUNET
has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to create its infra-
structure." Id.
143 John Curran, then Chief Technical Officer of GTE
Internetworking, was quoted as saying that the traffic ex-
change with Exodus was "'wildly asymmetrical,"' and that as
a result Exodus was getting a free ride from GTE In-
ternetworking. Gerwig, supra note 130. Genuity now specifi-
cally states in its Internet Interconnection Guidelines that
itive market, these refusals may not have any anti-
competitive intent or effect; indeed, such refusals
may in fact have a pro-competitive result. A
smaller backbone, denied peering on the grounds
of free-riding, may then have an incentive to in-
vest in infrastructure and compete for a varied
mix of new customers in order to qualify for peer-
ing - resulting in an increased number of compet-
ing national backbone providers. As discussed be-
low, this is only possible if the denied smaller
backbone is able to enter the market with a transit
relationship.
A more ambiguous example of free-riding
arises when a backbone is refused peering be-
cause it has a small customer base. There are indi-
cations that a backbone may refuse to peer with a
smaller backbone based on the amount of traffic
generated by the smaller backbone. For instance,
the published peering policies of UUNET, Sprint
and Genuity all contain a requirement that a
peering candidate be able to exchange a certain
minimum amount of data at the beginning of the
peering relationship. 144 An MCI spokesperson was
quoted as saying that, for this reason, Level 3 was
denied peering by MCI.1 45 One justification given
by the larger backbones is that it is difficult and
costly to allocate necessary resources to potential
peers with low current volumes that may or may
not grow rapidly in the future. Nevertheless, this
requirement may place backbones with low
volumes in a Catch-22 situation; without a large
number of customers generating traffic volume, it
is not possible to negotiate peering arrangements
with the large backbones; yet without peering, it
may be difficult to gain the large number of cus-
one of the criteria for traffic exchange with Genuity is, "[flor
domestic ISPs, roughly balanced traffic." GENUITY INTERCON-
NECrION GUmELINES, supra note 140. Similarly, Bob Leahy,
Vice President of Marketing for PSINet, stated of Exodus that
"[w]e were tired of carrying their load. They are a pure host-
ing play. What makes them meritorious to get free peering?"
Kady, supra note 130.
144 WorldCom expects that "the aggregate amount of
traffic exchanged in each direction over all interconnection
links between the Requester and the WorldCom Internet
Network... shall equal or exceed 150 Mbps of traffic [in the
United States]." WORLDCOM PEERING POLICY, supra note 140.
Sprint's peering policy has a provision that the "average
monthly traffic exchange between Sprint and the peering
network must be justifiable." Sprint Peering Policy, supra
note 140. One of the criteria for traffic exchange with
Genuity is a "minimum Internet traffic exchange of I Mbps
with Autonomous System 1." GENUrrv INTERCONNECTION
GUIDELINES, supra note 140.
145 Engebretson, supra note 128.
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tomers necessary to generate the traffic volume to
qualify for peering. In order to determine
whether the latter statement is valid, one must ex-
amine the implications for smaller backbones of
not being able to peer with larger backbones.
It is important to differentiate between larger
backbones refusing to interconnect with smaller
backbones, versus the larger backbones only re-
fusing to peer with smaller backbones. Instead of
peering with the smaller backbones, the larger
backbones may offer them a transit arrange-
ment.146 For instance, if backbone A is refused
peering by backbone B, then backbone A could
use a transit arrangement in order for its custom-
ers to have access to backbone B's customers.
Backbone A could take transit directly from back-
bone B, or it could become a transit customer of a
third backbone C that is interconnected with
backbone B, as in Figure 5.
Having denied peering to smaller backbones,
one might question whether the larger top-tier
backbones providing transit would refuse to ei-
ther provide transit to smaller backbones or sim-
ply increase the cost of transit in order to squeeze
out the smaller rivals. There are two reasons that
this would be unlikely in a competitive backbone
market. The first reason is unique to the Internet.
In negotiating peering, one important bargaining
chip is the number of customers to which a back-
bone provides access; this includes the number of
transit customers. Therefore, backbones will com-
pete with each other to win transit customers to
use as leverage when negotiating peering relation-
ships with other backbones. The second reason is
traditional. The large backbones will compete for
the transit business of smaller backbones in order
to increase their revenues, which will keep transit
prices down. In a growing market like the In-
ternet market, in particular, one would not expect
it to be profitable for a competitive backbone to
raise prices and thereby restrict sales and growth
in sales. Therefore, in a competitive backbone
market, no backbone provider is likely to find it
146 See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential
Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of Internet Balkani-
zation, 3 VA.J.L. & TECH., 1522, para. 16 (1998) [hereinafter
Frieden].
147 UUNET May 12, 1997 Press Release, supra note 141.
A T-1 connection is a digital transmission link with a capacity
of 1.544 Mbps. A fractional T-3 connection is a portion of a
T-3 (44.7364 Mbps) digital transmission link. Letter from
profitable to ue a price squeeze to disadvantage
smaller rivals.
As a transit customer, it may be possible for a
smaller backbone provider to grow and later qual-
ify to peer with backbones that initially refused
peering, including the transit supplier. Although
a smaller backbone may prefer peering rather
then being a paying transit customer either for
quality or cost reasons, in a competitive market, a
smaller backbone that only interconnects via a
transit arrangement might not be at a competitive
disadvantage.
Because transit does not involve the same ser-
vice as peering, refusing peering in favor of transit
is not simply a means of charging for a service
that is otherwise provided free of charge. In a
transit relationship, one backbone must pay an-
other for access to the Internet. For instance, at
the time that UUNET changed its peering policy
in 1997, it announced that wholesale connectivity
started at $2,000 per month for a T-1 connection
and $6,000 for a fractional T-3 connection.
47
Transit customers receive benefits in return for
these payments. When backbones pay for transit
they benefit from the infrastructure investments
of national or global backbones without having to
make or utilize their own investments. In addi-
tion, as noted above, transit gives a backbone ac-
cess to the entire Internet, not just to the custom-
ers of the peering partner. In order to provide
transit customers with access to the entire In-
ternet, the transit provider must either maintain
peering arrangements with a number of other
backbones or must pay for transit from yet an-
other backbone. In other words, a backbone pro-
viding transit services is providing access to a
greater array of end users and content than it
would as a peer, thereby incurring correspond-
ingly higher costs that are recuperated in the
transit payments. In a competitive backbone mar-
ket, transit prices should reflect costs and should
not put entering backbones at a competitive dis-
advantage.
Terrence J. Ferguson, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Level 3 Communications, to Michelle Carey, Com-
mon Carrier Bureau, FCC (August 7, 1998) (filed in Applica-
tion of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corpora-
tion for Transfer of Control of MCI Communications Corpo-




In terms of the quality of transit, Level 3 has
suggested that, as a transit customer of another
backbone, it would depend on the supplying
backbone for delivery of IP traffic, at the very least
placing Level 3 at a marketing disadvantage.
1 48
This view was affirmed in the DOJ Complaint in
the MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger proceed-
ing.149 Nevertheless, at least one backbone, SAV-
VIS, initially relied only on transit connections
and not peering and was very competitive in terms
of quality.' 50 Quality may improve with transit, at
least compared with public peering at a NAP, be-
cause a transit connection may avoid the conges-
tion of passing through a NAP to get access to a
backbone. According to an executive at Digex, a
Web-hosting company that used to own its own
backbone, "[w]ith free peering, the level of ser-
vice is not as good. It costs more [to pay for ac-
cess], but the quality of service is better."'151 In
sum, there is evidence that paying for transit does
not put a transit customer at an insurmountable
disadvantage from a quality point of view.
In conclusion, the presence of a large number
of top-tier backbones can prevent any anti-com-
petitive actions. In a competitive backbone mar-
ket, no large backbone would unilaterally end
peering with another, as it has no guarantee that
it would benefit from such an action. Further-
more, there would be no insurmountable barrier
to entry or growth of smaller backbones. Larger
top-tier backbones would continue to compete to
provide transit services to smaller backbones.
These smaller backbones would be able to resell
these services to their own customers and would
not seem to face any barrier to acquiring either
the infrastructure or customer base that could en-
able them eventually to join the ranks of the
larger backbones and qualify for peering. Actual,
as well as potential, entry by new backbones would
148 Level 3 May 29, 1998 Ex Parte, supra note 132, at 4.
149 DOJ WorldCom Sprint Complaint, supra note 114, at
13.
150 Doug Mohney, SAVVIS Shifts Gears and Ownership,
BOARDWATCH, at http://boardwatch.internet.on/mag/99/
apr/bwm66.html (Apr. 1999). In 1997, SAVVIS Internet was
rated the highest quality backbone provider by Keynote Sys-
tems. Jack Rickard, Editor's Notes, BOARMWATCH MAGAZINE
(May 1998). At the time, SAVVIS created private NAPs,
bought transit from the largest backbones and did not peer
at all, though Rickard notes that this is expensive.
151 Kady, supra note 130, at 3 (quoting Bobby Patrick,
Vice President of Strategy at Digex).
152 The issue of backbone consolidation during the
MCI/WorldCom merger proceeding was resolved when MCI
act to constrain the actions of larger incumbent
backbones, keeping prices at competitive levels.
b. Backbone Market with a Dominant Firm
If, on the other hand, a single backbone were
dominant, it would be able to harm the public in-
terest by engaging in a number of anti-competi-
tive actions. As discussed above, it appears un-
likely that a firm may organically grow to become
dominant. Instead, the route to such dominance
would likely be achieved by consolidation be-
tween backbone providers or by achieving market
power over a key bottleneck input, such as trans-
mission facilities. The issue of consolidation was at
the heart of the debate surrounding WorldCom's
acquisition of MCI and, later, MCI WorldCom's
acquisition of Sprint. 1 5 2 A number of potential
anti-competitive harms were raised by commenta-
tors in the MCI/WorldCom merger proceeding
and identified in the Commission's MCI/
WorldCom Order. '
5 3
A dominant backbone could harm the public
interest in a number of ways. First, by definition, a
dominant firm has the unilateral ability to profita-
bly raise and sustain retail prices above competi-
tive levels. In addition, a dominant backbone
would have both the ability and the incentive to
stop cooperating with smaller backbones. Failure
to cooperate could take a number of forms, in-
cluding refusing to interconnect at all, executing
a price squeeze, or degrading the quality of inter-
connection by not upgrading the capacity of con-
nections with smaller backbones.
A dominant backbone could also abuse market
power by refusing to interconnect with smaller
backbones. The network externalities literature
has shown that, in general, a larger network has
less of an incentive to become compatible or in-
divested its Internet business to Cable & Wireless. See infra
note 131. Later, because of the backbone consolidation, as
well as other concerns, both the European Commission and
the Department of Justice acted to block the MCI
WorldCom/Sprint merger. See Press Release, Department of
Justice,Justice Department Sues to Block WorldCom's Acqui-
sition of Sprint (June 27, 2000); Press Release, European
Commission, Commission Prohibits Merger Between MCI
WorldCom and Sprint Uune 28, 2000) [hereinafter Euro-
pean Commission WorldCom Sprint Press Release].
153 MCI/WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. paras. 149-150.
Similar issues were raised by the Department ofJustice in the
course of the MCI WorldCom Sprint proceeding. See DOJ
WorldCom Sprint Complaint, supra note 114, at n.165.
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terconnect with a smaller network, as customers
of the smaller network have more to gain from
being able to communicate with customers of the
larger network than vice versa. 15 4 In the context
of the Internet, if a dominant backbone refused
to interconnect with a smaller one, the customers
of the smaller backbone would have an incentive
to switch to the larger network in order to enjoy
the network externalities associated with the
larger backbone's customer base. Although cus-
tomers of the dominant backbone would also lose
access to the smaller network's customer base,
they are unlikely to respond by switching to the
smaller network. As a result, the smaller backbone
would be positioned poorly to compete for cus-
tomers, reinforcing the dominance of the largest
backbone. It is noteworthy that the advantage of
dominant networks also characterizes local te-
lephony, where incumbent LECs must be com-
pelled by statute to interconnect with smaller
competitive LECs.
1 55
A dominant backbone could also exercise mar-
ket power by executing a price squeeze on those
smaller backbones with which it interconnects. In
a price squeeze situation, a vertically integrated
firm with market power over an essential up-
stream input raises the price of this input to rivals
competing in downstream retail markets.156 The
increased cost of this essential input forces down-
stream rivals to raise their retail prices. 57 The ver-
tically integrated firm is then in a position to un-
dercut the downstream rivals in retail markets and
thereby increase market share and profits. 158 In
the backbone example, interconnection is the es-
sential input that smaller backbones must have
from the dominant backbone in order to compete
with the dominant backbone to sell backbone ser-
vices to ISPs or directly to end users. Dominant
backbones can refuse to peer with smaller back-
bones and also raise the price of transit services
charged to those same backbones. This will
weaken existing rivals and also prevent the entry
of new backbones. As a result, the dominant back-
154 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 19; Jacques Cremer et al.,
Connectivity in the Commercial Internet (May 1999) (mime-
ographed material) [hereinafter Cremer et al.].
155 See 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000).
156 Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and
Effects, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 193 (Rich-
ard Schmalensee & Robert Willig, eds., 1992).
157 Id.
158 Id.
bone can raise downstream prices and increase
profits.
A dominant backbone also might engage in
non-price discrimination against rival backbones
by degrading interconnections with rivals in order
to win their customers. 15 9 This could most easily
be done by "slow rolling" necessary increases in
the capacity of the trunks used to interconnect
with other backbones. Such capacity increases are
a regular necessity to keep pace with the rapid
growth in demand for Internet services. Under
this scheme, a backbone, A, may degrade a con-
nection with a smaller backbone, B. As B's cus-
tomers begin to feel the effects of this degrada-
tion when communicating with customers of
backbone A, they may switch to backbone A in or-
der to improve connections with customers of
backbone A. It should be noted that, with two-way
interconnections, the customers of backbone A
would also be affected by this degradation when
they attempt to communicate with the customers
of backbone B. For this reason, A must be signifi-
cantly larger than B so that its customers are rela-
tively less adversely affected than the customers of
B are and do not themselves switch. 160 In order to
limit further the effects of non-price discrimina-
tion on its own customers, backbone A would en-
gage in what it called "serial degradation" and tar-
get only one smaller backbone at a time. 16 1
Thus, if a backbone were to become dominant,
it could act in an anti-competitive fashion. Such a
backbone market would share many characteris-
tics with other network industries that tradition-
ally warranted regulation, and it might then be in
the public interest to apply similar regulations to
the backbone market. However, at this time, as
long as there are a number of competing top-tier
backbone providers, entry by smaller backbones
into the market is possible. In that case, there
would be no need for any change in the current
unregulated status of the Internet. Although com-
petition between backbone providers is unregu-
lated, consumers nevertheless benefit from the
159 See Cremer et al., supra note 154. These authors ad-
vised GTE on the non-price discrimination issue during the
MCI WorldCom proceeding and formalized their analysis in
that paper.
160 GTE and its experts note that in a situation in which
there is no dominant backbone, there would be no incentive
for any backbone to attempt a serial degradation strategy in
order to become dominant. See id. at Section 6.
161 See Cremer et al., supra note 154.
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same protections afforded consumers of all prod-
ucts and services. Existing antitrust policies, as ap-
plied in the MCI/WorldCom and MCI
WorldCom/Sprint merger proceedings by the De-
partment of Justice and the European Commis-
sion, along with the Federal Communication
Commission's application of the public interest
standard in the MCI/WorldCom case, can pre-
vent the emergence of a dominant backbone in
an otherwise competitive market.
162
3. Consumer Protection in the Backbone Market
This paper has already discussed the underpin-
nings of the industry-specific regulation of net-
work industries. When the underlying cost struc-
ture of an industry does not support competition,
it may be in the public interest to regulate the
prices and services offered by the resulting natu-
ral monopoly. Where competition is possible, reg-
ulation may be relaxed or eliminated to the ex-
tent that market forces can govern prices and ser-
vices in place of regulations. Even where competi-
tion is possible, however, it is not guaranteed. As a
result, antitrust laws have been enacted to protect
consumers from anti-competitive behavior by a
firm (or firms) that seeks to acquire or exploit
market power.'163 The antitrust laws apply to the
Internet backbone as they do to every other prod-
uct and service market, and indeed they already
have been invoked in the cases of the MCI/
WorldCom and MCI WorldCom/Sprint merg-
ers. 164 Many of the above arguments about the po-
tential actions of a dominant backbone were
raised during these merger proceedings. 165 These
proceedings showed that the combined efforts of
the European Commission and the Department
of Justice, enforcing relevant antitrust statutes, as
well as the Commission itself, upholding the pub-
162 See MCI/WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. paras. 8-14.
163 See STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 45-50 (2nd ed. 1994).
164 See DOJ MCI WorldCom Press Release, supra note
131.
165 See, e.g., DOJ WorldCom Sprint Complaint, supra
note 114, at 9-21.
166 See infra at note 81.
167 See infra at note 131.
168 See C&W Seen Urging EU to be Tough on MCI, Sprint
Buy, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 29, 1999; see also
MCI/WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. paras. 151-56.
169 MCI/WorldCom Order, 13 FCC Rcd. Paras. 151-156.;
See also European Union MCI/WorldCom Press Release,
supra note 131; DOJ MCI WorldCom Press Release, supra
lic interest standard, could prevent an increase in
the concentration of the backbone market that
could threaten consumer welfare.
16 6
In the MCI/WorldCom merger proceeding,
MCI divested its Internet business to Cable &
Wireless in order to eliminate any overlap be-
tween MCI and WorldCom in the Internet back-
bone market and thereby satisfied concerns ex-
pressed by the Department of Justice and the Eu-
ropean Union. 167 Parties argued at the time, how-
ever, that the degree to which MCI's Internet bus-
iness was integrated with its other business units
might complicate such a divestiture, in compari-
son with the divestiture of a stand-alone business
unit such as WorldCom's UUNET backbone.'
68
All relevant agencies approved the transaction
based on their conclusion that the terms of the
divestiture contract adequately addressed any po-
tential complications arising from the divestiture
of an integrated unit such as MCI's Internet busi-
ness. 169 Since the divestiture, however, Cable &
Wireless filed suit against MCI, claiming that MCI
breached the divestiture contract by not transfer-
ring its complete Internet business; 70 according
to Mike McTighe, Chief Executive Officer of
Global Operations for Cable & Wireless, "MCI
WorldCom's material breaches of the [divesti-
ture] Undertakings threaten to impair Cable &
Wireless's competitiveness."1 71 This suit, which
was settled, shows that the details of a divestiture
may be important. 72 A complete divestiture of a
business unit by one of the merging firms may
mean that the market share of the merged entity
does not change as a result of the merger. How-
ever, the competitive landscape may nevertheless
change if the divested unit is harmed as a result of
the divestiture and, therefore, poses less of a com-
petitive constraint to the merged firm.
1 7 3
In addition to this horizontal concentration in
note 131.
170 Hearing on Telecommunication Mergers Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Mike McTighe, Chief Executive
Officer, Global Operations, Cable & Wireless) [hereinafter
McTighe testimony]; see also Denise Pappalardo, Did Cable &
Wireless Get the Shaft?, NETWORK WORLD, April 5,1999 [herein-
after Pappalardo].
171 See McTighe testimony, supra note 170.
172 Press Release, Cable & Wireless, MCI WorldCom and
Cable & Wireless Reach Agreement over Internet Dispute
(Mar. 1, 2000) ("MCI WorldCom has agreed to pay Cable &
Wireless $200 million in full and final settlement of the dis-
putes.").
173 In the recent MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger pro-
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the backbone market, vertical integration could
also lead to market power. Backbones may verti-
cally integrate upstream into the market for the
telecommunications inputs that underlie the ser-
vices that backbones provide. Indeed, many back-
bones, such as WorldCom and Sprint, are already
vertically integrated, owning their own fiber optic
networks. 1 74 Because telecommunications trans-
port capacity is readily available today from a wide
variety of providers, including the vertically inte-
grated backbones themselves, vertical integration
itself is unlikely to create a barrier to entry. As
with mergers of backbones, antitrust laws and
merger policy should prevent undue consolida-
tion of the telecommunications transport market
that could lead the remaining telecommunica-
tions providers to engage in anti-competitive ac-
tions in the downstream Internet backbone mar-
ket. In addition, existing common carrier regula-
tions prevent vertically integrated telecommunica-
tions carriers from refusing to provide any neces-
sary upstream telecommunications services
sought by competing backbone providers. 175
There also may be concern about downstream
relationships between backbones and the Internet
Service Providers for whom backbone services are
a vital input. In addition to vertical integration,
backbone providers could enter into exclusive
dealing arrangements with ISPs, such that the
backbone provider would provide only one ISP
with its services. Likewise, backbones that already
are vertically integrated with ISPs could choose
not to provide backbone services to unaffiliated
ISPs. In the growing Internet market such an ex-
clusionary arrangement is unlikely, however, be-
cause backbones have incentives to increase the
number of customers that they have as bargaining
chips in peering negotiations. 176 In addition,
given the availability of telecommunications in-
puts and transit arrangements, the possibilities of
entry into either the ISP market or the backbone
market could not be foreclosed by such a vertical
arrangement.
Thus, the lack of industry-specific regulation of
Internet backbones does not expose consumers to
ceeding, the European Commission found the merging par-
ties' proposal to divest Sprint's Internet business insufficient,
concluding that the divested business would not "become a
strong, viable competitor to prevent the merged WorldCom/
Sprint from dominating Internet backbone." European Com-
mission WorldCom Sprint Press Release, supra note 152. The
European Commission noted that it explicitly took into ac-
economic risks that are different than those faced
by consumers of other non-network products and
services. Internet markets are subject to the same
antitrust regulations that act to govern other in-
dustries in the event that competition is no longer
able to provide customers with just and reasona-
ble prices and quality levels.
The sections above show how, in a competitive
environment without a dominant firm, intercon-
nection, either by transit or peering, will be availa-
ble to existing and new backbones. While consoli-
dation is the most obvious means for a backbone
to become dominant, as discussed above, there
are other means by which a backbone could grow
to become dominant. For example, one way is for
a provider to leverage market power over last-mile
access to end users into market power in the back-
bone market - an important issue that is best left
to an analysis of the market for last-mile access. In
another scenario, a new or existing backbone
could develop a proprietary technology that
makes it either more efficient or more attractive
to end-user customers. If this technology is a new
service, for example, the backbone may choose
not to interconnect with other backbones for the
provision of this new service. As customers switch
to this backbone in order to benefit from the new
service, the backbone may grow to become domi-
nant.
If a dominant backbone provider were to
emerge, this backbone provider could engage in a
variety of anti-competitive actions, as described
above, that would ultimately harm consumers. In
this case, industry-specific regulation of the domi-
nant backbone provider may be in the public in-
terest. Other network industries such as telephony
also have warranted industry-specific regulation,
and the resulting regulations may provide a tem-
plate for the regulations that could be imposed
on a dominant backbone provider. Such regula-
tions could include, for instance, interconnection
obligations that would govern the peering and
transit relationships offered by the dominant
backbone provider. Any regulation of the In-
ternet backbone market would represent a signifi-
count the issues raised by Cable & Wireless after its purchase
of MCI's Internet assets. Id.
174 See FCC, CCB, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE END OF
YEAR 1998 14 (staff report authored by Jonathan M. Kraus-
haar) (1999).
175 47 U.S.C. §202 (2000).
176 See infra at Section III.A.2.a.
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cant shift in the unregulated status quo under
which the Internet industry has grown at unprece-
dented rates and, therefore, would require a cor-
responding significant shift in the competitiveness
of the market.
B. Internet Balkanization Issues
Although it is unlikely that any backbone will
become dominant and act anti-competitively,
some would argue that today's environment of
universal connectivity among backbones may be
unstable in the long run. Internet backbones may
attempt to differentiate themselves from each
other by offering certain new or existing services
only to their own customers in order to raise retail
prices and help attract new customers. As a result,
the Internet may "balkanize," with competing
backbones not interconnecting to provide all ser-
vices. 177 This may resemble the early days of te-
lephony, when all local companies were not inter-
connected. 1 78
The dynamic nature of the Internet means that
today's market structure and relationships likely
will change. New services are continually being
made available over the Internet. Many of these
services, including Internet telephony and video-
conferencing, are real-time applications that are
sensitive to any delays in transmission. 179 As a re-
sult, quality of service ("QoS") is becoming a criti-
cal issue for backbones and ISPs. Two backbones
establish high-quality interconnections over which
they could guarantee QoS levels to their custom-
ers wishing to communicate in real-time with cus-
tomers of the other backbone,'8 0 based on the ec-
onomics behind a decision to interconnect to
guarantee QoS, while assuming that any technical
barriers to such interconnection could be over-
come. 181 Backbones face a number of private eco-
nomic considerations in making such intercon-
nection decisions. Any private decision by one or
more backbones not to interconnect to guarantee
QoS levels for new services may also have public
consequences, however, as consumers of one
backbone may not be able to use these new ser-
177 See Frieden, supra note 146. Professor Frieden raises
issues similar to the ones dealt with in this paper, with a focus
on the effects of such balkanization on universal access to the
Internet, notably in rural areas.
178 See infra note 185.
179 See, e.g., THE NEW McGRAw-HILL TELECOM FACTBOOK
266 (Joseph A. Pecar & David A. Garbin, eds., 2nd ed. 2000).
vices to communicate with consumers of another
backbone. There are strong market forces that
would lead firms to interconnect in order to ex-
change traffic originating from these new services.
If such interconnection does not materialize, pro-
ponents of any industry-specific interconnection
regulation should nevertheless show why the lack
of such interconnection justifies regulatory inter-
vention.
The decision to interconnect for the provision
of QoS services would appear to be relatively simi-
lar to the one that backbones currently make
when deciding whether to peer with one another.
The backbones each calculate whether the bene-
fits of interconnecting with one or more other
backbones would outweigh the costs. The benefits
of interconnecting to exchange traffic flow from
increasing the network of customers with whom
one can communicate helps attract new users and
encourages usage from existing users. The cost
comes from a competitive network externality, as
defined above; one backbone's decision to inter-
connect with another backbone makes the other
backbone more attractive to customers. The wide-
spread interconnection available today in the
form of either peering or transit agreements indi-
cates that currently the benefits of interconnec-
tion outweigh any costs.
There is, however, a difference between current
interconnection arrangements and new intercon-
nection arrangements for the exchange of QoS
traffic. The Internet services that interconnection
enables today, such as e-mail and Web access, al-
ready are universally available, and no one back-
bone or ISP could differentiate itself based on its
unique provision of these services. Universal con-
nectivity, however, is a legacy of the cooperative
spirit that characterized the Internet in its early
days. In the commercial spirit that pervades the
Internet today, backbones and ISPs may view the
new services that rely on QoS as a means to differ-
entiate themselves from their competitors. A firm
that introduces these new services may be less will-
ing to share the ability to provide these services
with competitors, as such sharing may reduce the
18 See also Michael Kende & Douglas C. Sicker, Slice and
Dice: The Fragmentation of the Internet (2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
181 See FCC, THE INTERNET INTERCONNECTION CONUN-
DRUM (working paper authored by Douglas C. Slicker, Joshua
Mindel & Cameron Cooper) (2000).
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ability of the firm to charge a premium to its own
customers. For instance, UUNET announced a
Service Level Agreement ("SLA") that guarantees,
among other things, the delivery speed (latency)
of customers' traffic on its own network.'8 2 Be-
cause this guarantee does not extend to traffic
that leaves UUNET's network, this encourages
customers to keep traffic on-net.1
8 3
Even if backbones agree in principle to inter-
connect in order to be able to offer new services
that require QoS guarantees, they may face practi-
cal difficulties in reaching a final interconnection
agreement. Aside from disagreements over the
terms of interconnection, it is possible that the
backbones or their ISP customers must support
compatible versions of a particular new service in
order to be able to exchange traffic that
originates with one backbone's end user and ter-
minates with another backbone's end user. Before
committing to a particular standard for this ser-
vice, backbones may wish to wait for an industry-
wide standard to emerge. This presents a coordi-
nation problem that may be difficult to resolve-
in particular, if any firms have developed their
own proprietary standards that they wish to see
adopted as the industry-wide standard. In this situ-
ation, in spite of the fact that backbones would be
willing to interconnect to exchange QoS traffic,
the end result may be the same as if they were not
willing to interconnect - end users would not be
able to communicate across backbones using cer-
tain services.
Another potential issue relating to interconnec-
tion for QoS services is that it may exacerbate cur-
rent congestion, and therefore it may be difficult
to guarantee QoS across backbones. Assuming
that interconnection for QoS traffic is imple-
mented under the current settlement-free peer-
ing system, backbones will not be paid to termi-
nate QoS traffic. As a result, receiving backbones
will have little or no economic incentive to in-
crease capacity to terminate this traffic. QoS traf-
fic that traverses networks may thus face conges-
182 See UUNET.com, at http://wwwl.worldcom.com/
uunet/.
183 Id.
184 Settlements are payments from a carrier that
originates traffic to another carrier for terminating this traf-
fic. See Henry Ergas & Paul Paterson, International Telecommu-
nications Settlement Arrangements; An Unsustainable Inheritance?,
TELECOMM. POL'Y, Feb. 1991, at 29. A form of settlement ex-
ists in international telephony today. Id. A settlement system
tion and would be unlikely to provide satisfactory
quality. Of course, similar problems exist today
with the current peering system, as described
above, leading to the current congestion, but
given the high data volume characterizing such
services, the problem may be worsened. In order
to provide the proper economic incentives to be
able to guarantee to customers that they can de-
liver QoS traffic across networks, backbones may
have to implement a traffic-sensitive settlement
system for such traffic.'
8 4
If backbones are unable to overcome the eco-
nomic, administrative and technical hurdles to in-
terconnect to exchange traffic flowing from new
services requiring QoS, then the Internet faces
the risk of balkanization. Backbones only would
provide certain new services for use among their
own customers. The result would be that network
externalities, once taken for granted, would sud-
denly play a major role for consumers of Internet
services. In the current environment of universal
connectivity, consumers who simply want to send
and receive e-mail and surf on the Web can
choose any retail provider without worrying about
the choices of other consumers or content provid-
ers. If the Internet balkanizes over the offering of
new services, consumers would need to be aware
of the choices of those with whom they wish to
communicate when making their own choice of
Internet provider. For instance, a consumer who
wishes to view real-time streaming video may need
to be sure that the provider is connected to the
same backbone to ensure high quality viewing.
Likewise, a business that wishes to use the In-
ternet for videoconferencing must make sure that
all relevant branches, customers and suppliers are
connected to the same backbone. Thus, any bal-
kanization of the Internet would result in a classic
example of network externalities; the specific
backbone choice of each consumer would influ-
ence the choices of other consumers.
As a result of any balkanization of the Internet
with respect to the provision of new services, cus-
for the Internet would enable backbones to recoup the costs
associated with terminating QoS traffic that originated on
other backbones, giving backbones the proper incentive to
invest in the capacity necessary to guarantee the timely deliv-
ery of this traffic. See, e.g., Maria Farnon & Scott Huddle, Set-
tlement Systems for the Internet, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET
377-403 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997). How-
ever, the technical and administrative costs of implementing
such a system on the Internet are formidable. Id.
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tomers wishing to communicate with a wide vari-
ety of others may end up subscribing to compet-
ing backbones, unless customers can coordinate
on the choice of one backbone. This would raise
the specter of the early days of telephony, when
competing telephone companies refused to inter-
connect, resulting in many businesses and even
some homes owning more than one telephone,
corresponding to multiple local telephone com-
pany subscriptions.1 85 As with the telephone sys-
tem before it, any Internet balkanization may lead
to calls for some form of interconnection regula-
tion for backbones. Such regulations are unlikely
to be necessary.
It is important to reiterate that network indus-
tries such as telephony, water and electricity have
historically been regulated based on their cost
structure to prevent a natural monopoly from ex-
ploiting customers. Such network industries are
not generally regulated solely to provide custom-
ers the demand-side network externalities de-
scribed above. 186 To impose interconnection reg-
ulations on Internet backbone providers in order
to increase the benefits from network externali-
ties for new services would represent a break from
regulatory tradition.
There are many examples of products like the
Internet that provide both direct and indirect net-
work externalities that are not subject to industry-
specific regulations.1 1 7 For instance, almost every
consumer electronics product consists of a hard-
ware/software system with indirect network exter-
nalities. The usefulness of compact disc players,
personal computers, web browsers and videocas-
sette recorders depends to a great degree, if not
totally, on the availability of compatible
"software." The greater the number of users of
the relevant "hardware," the more software will be
available. Likewise, fax machines and e-mail in-
volve direct communications between end users
185 As an example of this phenomenon, in 1910, Louis-
ville, Kentucky was served by two local telephone compa-
nies-the Bell-licensed Cumberland Telephone and the in-
dependent Home Telephone Company. See MILTON L. MUEL-
LER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNEcTION,
AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPH4ONE
SYSTEM 82 (1997). More than 75% of the large businesses and
9% of homes in Louisville subscribed to both services. Id.
186 For instance, the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, in
which AT&T agreed to interconnect with independent local
firms to provide long distance services, was made in response
to a threatened antitrust suit, rather than calls to enable uni-
versal access for customers. See infra note 85.
187 See infra Section I.D. 1.
with corresponding direct network externalities.
In all of these cases, the market set the adopted
standards or ensured that various companies'
products were compatible with one another with-
out any government intervention.
The marketplace has been quite successful at
choosing standards that allow the products and
services of different companies to be compatible
with one another. Often, this is accomplished by a
standards battle, such as the one waged between
Betamax and VHS for the videocassette recorder
standard.' In other cases, one firm may create
an adapter that enables its products to be compat-
ible with the products of another firm.18 9 Another
factor leading to compatibility is that firms in nas-
cent industries have an incentive to cooperate on
setting common standards that will enable the in-
dustry to grow so that later they can compete with
one another over larger slices of the growing
pie.
190
In some cases, notably the personal computer
market, more than one standard emerges, at least
in part in response to consumer demand, as Ap-
ple is widely seen as meeting the demands of a
niche market, while the IBM (Intel/Windows)
standard meets the more general needs of the
mass market.'19 It is worth noting here that it has
been Internet protocols and applications, such as
Web browsers and the Java language, that have
served to meet the demands of users of IBM and
Apple's respective platforms to interact seamlessly
with one another. 9 2 A final example of a stan-
dard emerging as a result of marketplace forces is
the Internet itself. The protocols at the heart of
the Internet, TCP/IP, only relatively recently be-
came the dominant standard for networking, at
the expense of a number of proprietary and non-
proprietary standards including SNA, DecNet and
X.25.19,
Although the marketplace is remarkably suc-
188 SeeJAMES LARDNER, FAS'r FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, HE
JAPANESE, AND VCR WARS (1987) [hereinafter LARDNER].
189 See Oz SiiY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETIWORK INDUSTRIES
17-18 (2001) [hereinafter SHY].
191) See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY .. NALEBUFF,
CO-OPETITION (1996).
I!" See Si-IY, supra note 189, at 28.
192 See infra note 193.
19-1 Transmission Control Protocol ("TCP") and Internet
Protocol ("IP") together form a "networking protocol that
provides communication across interconnected networks, be-
tween computers with diverse hardware architectures and va-
rious operating systems." NEWTON, supra note 17, at 708.
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cessful at generating compatible standards, it
would be a mistake to conclude that this process is
costless for consumers or firms. Purchasers of
Sony's Betamax VCRs found it impossible to rent
or buy movies after the VHS standard won the
standards battle, while Sony was forced to con-
cede and begin selling its competitors' stan-
dard.194 The government could theoretically have
chosen a standard, thereby avoiding these costs.
Nevertheless, in the United States, consumers and
firms rarely, if ever, call for government interven-
tion in these cases.
The marketplace is the preferred means for set-
ting compatible standards in most industries and
for most products for a variety of reasons. First, an
open marketplace for standards leads to healthy
competition for the rewards of owning a standard,
and often "second-mover" standards are able to
overcome an industry leader by embodying their
standards in better products or more creative
marketing of these products. 95 Second, as de-
scribed above, innovators such as Apple Com-
puter may target new products at niche markets,
with consumers benefiting from the resulting vari-
ety. Such variety and innovation may not occur if
a standard is chosen by non-market means. There-
fore, while the marketplace may increase short-
run costs involved with adopting new standards,
the long-run marketplace benefits of competition
and innovation are likely to more than make up
for any short-run costs.
The marketplace should provide solutions to
many, if not all, of the challenges that arise in the
provision of current and new Internet services.
Consumers, with expectations of universal con-
nectivity and basic compatibility, are likely to de-
mand that backbones essentially set standards for
the provision of QoS services by agreeing to inter-
connect to provide these services. Backbones, in
turn, may see that it is in their interest to inter-
connect in order to enable the market for QoS
194 See LARDNER, supra note 188.
195 For instance, VHS was able to overcome the Betamax
lead to become the industry standard by providing longer re-
cording times, among other things. Indeed, some attribute
the initial advantage of VHS in the United States to the deci-
sion by its manufacturer to make tapes long enough to re-
cord a full American football game.
196 The 1996 Act states that it is the policy of the United
States to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for interactive computer services, unfet-
tered by Federal or State regulation." 47 U.S.C. §230 (b) (2)
(2000).
services to grow. If firms limit offerings of new
QoS services to their own customers, other mar-
ketplace solutions are available that may ensure
that consumers can remain connected to the full
Internet. For instance, if two backbones are una-
ble to coordinate an interconnection agreement
enabling interconnection for QoS services, con-
sumers may simply interconnect to more than one
backbone, a practice known as multihoming, or
turn to firms such as InterNAP that connect with
all major backbones, enabling their customers to
communicate directly with the customers of all
major backbones without themselves multihom-
ing. Marketplace demands and market-driven in-
novations may alleviate the costs of any Internet
balkanization, if not preventing it altogether, in
more efficient ways than would the imposition of
any interconnection regulations on the Internet.
In summary, if one or more backbones choose
not to interconnect with other backbones for the
provision of new services in the future, this is
likely to be a temporary phase. This phase would
end as a result of market forces that would induce
backbones to interconnect, while at the same
time, compelling pioneering providers to step
into the breach to provide interconnection ser-
vices for end users. Nevertheless, during this
phase there may be calls to implement some form
of interconnection regulation. Such intervention
would be relatively unique, as there is little prece-
dent for the regulation of networks such as the
Internet where there are low entry barriers on the
cost side. In addition, regulatory intervention
would be a notable shift in United States policy.
19 6
As a result, any calls to intervene in the Internet
market would require a correspondingly high bur-
den of proof.
Some are calling for regulatory intervention in
the interactions between backbones because (1)
the lack of interconnection would lead to market
power, with adverse effects on consumers; 19 7 and
197 It is often argued that in markets with network exter-
nalities, lack of interconnection or compatibility will lead to
"tipping," as consumers quickly converge on one standard in
order to enjoy the benefits of being compatible with the larg-
est possible installed base of the product. According to Stan
J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, "tipping occurs when a
product subject to increasing returns [network externalities]
generates sufficient momentum in market share that its dom-
ination of the market becomes inevitable." STAN J. LIEBOWITZ
& STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOvr:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 138
(1999). After studying a number of software markets in
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(2) regardless of whether market power develops,
interconnection between Internet backbones, en-
abling seamless communication between all In-
ternet users, is in the public interest. However, an
antitrust approach, rather than an ongoing regu-
latory approach, is the appropriate solution to
protect consumers from any potential adverse ef-
fects of market power. In addition, the benefits
and the costs of mandating interconnection and
their balancing have not been shown. The bene-
fits stem from the network externalities that back-
bones will be able to deliver to end user custom-
ers; the costs of mandated interconnection could
include a lowered incentive to innovate in provid-
ing new services, less variety of new services, and
any regulatory costs incurred by firms and the reg-
ulatory agency. Finally, the realities of mandated
interconnection have not been addressed-who
determines the terms of interconnection, the
principles governing these terms of interconnec-
tion and how these terms should be enforced.
Given the complicated nature of interactions be-
tween backbones, intervention may be complex;
however, as described above, it is likely to be un-
necessary as long as competition governs the in-
teractions between backbones.
which Microsoft participates, the authors conclude that there
is no evidence of tipping in these markets. Id. at 228-229.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past several years, a number of Internet
backbones have questioned whether the commer-
cial interconnection negotiations between back-
bone providers can yield fair outcomes for all par-
ties. In addition, backbones may attempt in the fu-
ture to differentiate themselves from their com-
petitors by not interconnecting to provide certain
new services. As a result, there may increasingly be
calls to impose interconnection obligations on In-
ternet backbone providers. Outcomes of a com-
petitive Internet backbone market can differ from
the network industries characterized by market
power that historically warranted interconnection
regulations. In addition, antitrust and competi-
tion protections can prevent any anti-competitive
consolidation among Internet backbone provid-
ers. In sum, any traditional telecommunications
regulation of Internet backbone interconnection
is made unnecessary by a competitive backbone
market, a conclusion that is consistent with sec-
tion 230 of the 1996 Act.'9 8
198 See infra note 125.
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